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João Chaves, São Paulo/Brazil
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The conceptual question among sovereignty, biopolitics and law: a sensible 
point between Foucault and Agamben 
 
Abstract: The concept of biopolitics has its origin on the Michel Foucault works developped since 
1975 to 1979. In this period, the author introduced the foundations for a new approach about the 
modern  government,  based  in  both  crescent  enpowerment  on  individuals  and  the  control  of 
populations.  The  theme  has  attracted  the  attentions  of  some  critical  political  studies,  with  many 
practical uses. However, I believe there is not enough consolidation about biopolitics as a concept 
and a comprehensive theory of the new political mechanisms. This uncertainness is more evident when 
the very role of Law is questioned in a biopolitical model, due to the archaic nature that Foucault 
gives to it. So the aim of the paper is to identify the theorical comprehension of biopolitics in a 
contemporary author as Giorgio Agamben to demonstrate his oppositions and proximities from the 
original idea of Michel Foucault. I propose that Agamben has the same difficulties of Foucault to deal 
with legal theory and Law inside biopolitics. Nevertheless, after a critical review on the works of this 
two authors, my conclusion is that a settlement of the concepts of Law and biopolitics depends of the 
surpassing of the Foucaldian version of Law as sovereignity, a clear delimitation of a common core 
between the authors and their differences and the research and affirmation of the concept of Law in 
Agamben, more well-refined than Foucault's one. 
Keywords: Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, biopolitics, Law.  
 
I. Introduction 
Throughout  the  last  decade,  it  was  noticeable  the  development  of  literature  about  the 
biopolitics problem, in many knowledge fields. Particularly after September 11th 2001 events, 
from  which  the  fight  against  terrorism  has  opened  up  a  new  dimension  of  international 
politics – a possible “world civil war” – and the materialization of human rights, there has 
been a perception that the classic categories of political theory would not be more effective to 
explain the new reality that was about to come.   
When Michel Foucault suggested the birth of a biopolitics as a kind of bigger concept to 
comprise the production of new control dispositives and investment in individuals, he had in 
mind his research about the birth of a disciplinary society in the XVIII century, the modern 
ways of government or of governmentality as a “reason of state” (raison d'État) and, in his 
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last courses in the Collège de France in the 70’s, the neoliberalism as a political model of 
management of life. To sum up, the gradual enhancement of countersovereign logic of “to let 
die and make it live”, announced in The Will to Know. 
Among many uses of biopolitics as an unfinished theoretical construction of Foucault, 
we highlight Roberto Esposito, Antonio Negri, Mauricio Lazzarato and other authors
2. None 
of them, though, is so close of the Foucaldian way of thinking like the Italian Giorgio 
Agamben, especially if we consider his production cycle so called Homo Sacer, from 1995 to 
2008. Agamben mentions, in a specific way, pieces of Foucault’s works and takes advantage 
of gaps left by the latter to build innovative reflections about politics, the ways of resistance 
and, also, about the law. 
Making reference to the theoretical development that Agamben makes of the ideas left 
behind by Foucault about the biopolitics paradigm, it is important to highlight this last topic: 
the law. If, in previous works, I've tried to demonstrate that Foucault sees law in the modern 
times as a mask or a residue, that will simply be put on by better refined ways of control that 
came from the biopolitics mechanisms as opposed to sovereignty, in Agamben this conclusion 
would not be possible.  
Now we have an author that has been presumably inserted, since the mid 90’s, in a large 
range debate about assumptions and effects of biopolitics, but that emphasizes the law as a 
field of study, and he also makes remarkable mentions about noble legal problems in Homo 
Sacer: the sovereign power and the nude life and State of Exception. I refer myself to the 
constituent power in opposition to constituted power, to the application of the legal norms, to 
the idea of “force without significance” of the law and, furthermore, to the Schmittian return 
about the nature of the exception in face of the law. 
The  question  I  try  to  answer  in  this  paper,  even  in  an  initial  version,  is:  How  does 
Agamben sees the law in the biopolitics perspective in comparison to Foucault? If, in one 
way, I presume that there is a connection between the authors in relation to the theme, being 
Agamben almost as a developer of themes left open because of Foucault’s premature death in 
1984 (and, in a certain way, for his well-known route changes among problems), on the other 
side there is a radically different appreciation about the law, that is being treated as a real field 
of debate.  
To reach this aim, I split the analysis of the theme in two parts.  
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In  the  first  moment,  it  seems  to  be  important  to  resume  a  well-known  relationship 
between the concepts of sovereignty and biopolitics in the works of both authors, being this 
an essential support point so that it is understood how both deal with the concept of law. 
In this second moment, in which the law is the main problem, I choose to associate 
Foucault to the image of negation, and Agamben to the emphasis about this concept. The 
difference in  their approaches seem  to be evident  to  me, but  a topic  still deserves  to be 
highlighted: Agamben would be the kind of jurist that enhances Foucault’s legacy in this field 
or, on the other side, his excessive connection with legal problems from a Schmittian point of 
view  would  damage  the  comprehension  of  contemporary  biopolitics?  Still  in  the  topic,  I 
intend to read both Foucault’s and Agamben’s works and highlight two topics with a possible 
asymmetry, both which would reinforce the question asked beforehand. 
 
II. Sovereignty, biopolitics and law in Foucault and Agamben 
1. From the opposition to the relationship of the dispositives in Foucault 
According to what has been said in the introduction of this paper, and within its previously 
explained  limits,  I  intend  to  remember  the  traditional  rivalry  between  the  concepts  of 
sovereignty and biopolitics in Foucault’s works. By the way, this topic has not escaped from 
the observation of the literature connected to the theme, and its comprehension seems to be 
essential to understand the idea I defend in relation to the absence of consideration of the law 
as a relevant object in the Foucaldian thought.  
In the course named Society Must Be Defended, given in 1976, Foucault presents an 
initial version and, we can say, a less refined one, about the space of sovereignty in the 
contemporary  model  of  power/knowledge.  The  most  important  characteristic  of  this 
comprehension of sovereignty as a dispositive is its strong association to the medieval way of 
thinking and to a certain return of Roman Law, reiteration of what has been affirmed in the 
lectures of Truth and juridical forms
3. After all, Foucault opposes what he calls a “legal-
political theory of sovereignty”, associated to the birth of the great administrative monarchies, 
to  the  discourse  of  discipline,  always  different  and  distant  from  the  model  of  law  as  a 
sovereign will and attached to the calculus of power investments in relation to the industrial 
capitalism
4. Although he states that both sovereignty and discipline are constitutive pieces of 
the current power dispositives, Foucault attaches himself to a primary distinction that made 
him adopt an opposition between them, generating questions of difficult – or even impossible, 
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aphoretic  –  solution  as  the  “new  form  of  right”,  as  announced  in  the  14
th  January  1976 
lecture
5.  
If  we  take  both  concepts  as  dispositives,  in  the  Foucaldian -Deleuzian  meaning  of 
strategic  arrangements  of  power  levels  and  knowledge  relatio nships,  we  can  say  that 
sovereignty, as well as its classic way of expression, which is the law, would be gradually 
replaced by another device of bigger adaptation and intensity, which is the discipline. While 
the first would imply in the growth of the imp ortance of the law, according to Johanna 
Oksala, the second one, the disciplinary power in Society must be defended, would generate a 
regression of the law, being this a characteristic topic, and a very precarious one, in the works 
of Foucault up to that moment
6. 
However, in a two -year period Foucault was able to refine his first hypothesis of 
relationship between sovereignty and discipline. Not by chance, this movement begun when 
he stopped to emphasize only the two concepts, but started to investigate with more attention 
the appearance of biopower and, as a consequence, of biopolitics, being the first understood 
as the growing investment of the devices in the domain of life and the second as a formation 
of a new governmentality, or the art of government of  the others, from this base
7. The main 
point  of  this  new  idea  of  the  relationships  between  the  devices  is  Security,  Territory, 
Population, lecture given in 1978. 
In the first class of this course, Foucault radically reverses his impression about the law. 
From something ancient, that intended to see almost expelled from Modernity like a medieval 
residue in the words of Hart and Wickham
8, the philosopher begins to integrate it to a set not 
only of two, but now three devices: sovereignty, discipline and  security. About the last one, 
he states that the growth of the security mechanisms, which don’t have anything new, and 
don’t imply in the cancellation of the legal structures. On the contrary, it feeds itself from 
them, through a “true legal inflation”
9.  
When  he  ruptures  with  the  successive  model  and  admit  a  set  of  devices  that  match 
themselves and are balanced in a biopower era (“there is not the legal age, the disciplinary 
age, the security age”
10) Foucault admits a scenario of mutual reactivations, predominances 
inside the co-existence of the three devices mentioned. This shows not only a softening, but a 
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true suppression of the dual way of thinking of Society Must Be Defended and other works 
from the same period.  
There  is  this  effort  in  many  moments.  Foucault  mentions  the  displaced  role  of  the 
sovereign, which begins to exercise the power not only over the bodies and the territory, but 
over a notion of “means”, that came from the security dispositive
11. He divides, in a didactic 
manner, the basic characteristics of sovereignty as prohibition of disorder, of discipline as a 
ban of the non-permitted and of security as a fine regulation of the movements of the reality
12. 
There is, still, an important mention to the increase and the transmutation of sovereignty. Here 
it follows a quotation:  
I don't want to say that sovereignty have stopped to play its role from the moment when 
the art of government have started to become a political science. I would rather say that never 
the problem of the sovereignty was taken  with such perception as in that moment when we 
dealt no more, as in the XVI or XVII centuries, to deduce some art of government from the 
sovereignty  theories,  but  clearly  presuming  that  there  has  been  already  some  art  of 
government and it was being developed, to see which legal and institutional form or which 
reason of law we could give to this sovereignty that characterizes a modern state
13 
Therefore, it seems evident to me that Foucault goes from an opposition between 
sovereignty and biopolitics, being this taken as a current and increasing way of government or 
the own governmentality announced in the 70’s, to a much more refined and better elaborated 
point of view about the concepts involved. Biopolitics, currently, would be taken, in my point 
of view, as a dynamic interaction among sovereignty, discipline and security, although I still 
believe that the law is solemnly ignored as it is a creative field of thinking. 
 
2. The Agambenian connection as an extension of biopolitics 
Giorgio Agamben, in his turn, advances a lot in the relationship between sovereignty and 
biopolitics, even if we consider the review undertaken by Foucault in  Security, Territory, 
Population as something already very relevant.  
It’s obvious to talk about the influence of Foucault over Agamben’s thought, although 
it’s worth to highlight the memory of Snoek and others from which the latter appears with 
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relevance in the cycle Homo Sacer from the first author
14, and that the degree and even the 
possibility of this dialogue aren’t unanimous in the posterior literature
15.  
In spite of mentioning this divergence, I believe that prevails the idea of a proximity or 
even filiation from Agamben to Foucault, and we can affirm that, as Leland de la Durantaye 
does, that the “Homo Sacer's strength is inseparable from its weakness: the radicalization of 
Foucault’s  paradigmatic  method”
16.  Another  suggested  possibility  is  to  take  Foucault  as 
Agamben’s methodological source, while Benjamin’s readings and, mainly, Heidegger would 
give it a foundation of his way of thinking
17. 
To Fuggle
18 e Bussolini
19 there is an evident connection between the Foucaldian and 
Agambenian concepts, although some problems of  dissymmetry as well as doubts about the 
results of the combined reading of both authors as a sequence or even combination. However, 
the best possible demonstration to this connection is the text What is an apparatus?, in which 
Agamben argues with a big interest Foucault’s methodological itinerary until he adopts the 
dispositives or apparatus explanation scheme
20 as his own. Anyway, the recognition of the 
Italian philosopher as an assumed Foucaldian, at least from the 90’s on, is very clear. 
Besides the method and the appropriation of the concepts, the Foucaldian reading made 
by  Agamben  reveals  itself  by  the  maintenance  of  the  problem  of  the  sovereignty  facing 
biopolitics. Yet, Agamben’s exit presumes something very different in relation to what he 
calls  “hidden  point  of  intersection  between  the  legal  institutional  model  and  the  power’s 
biopolitical model”
21, what I interpret as a “blind point”, left open by Foucault. 
To Oksala, to whom I agree with, both Foucault and Agamben admit the inevitability of 
the biopower, not treating it as a consistent aberration of the mix of incompatible elements as 
life and politics (characteristic hypothesis of, v.g, Hannah Arendt). The question is to have 
Foucault focused on the origin of biopower and the enhancement of governamentability and 
of biopolitics from some moment of Modern times, between the XVI and XVIII centuries, 
while Agamben in Homo Sacer points out biopower as a kind of side effect of occidental 
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metaphysics. To him, therefore, the naked life mentioned in Homo Sacer would remain as a 
“hidden foundation of politics”
22, also identified as his genealogy or counter-history
23. 
If biopower is an intrinsic reality to politics from the pressure between  bíos and zoé, 
bringing nowadays the need of a permanent redefinition of space of life and the rule then 
obtained  as  an  origin  and  foundation  of  the  concept  of  sovereignty
24, the Angambenian 
problem ceases to be the one to establish any historical limit and delimit the eruption of one 
disciplinary or security investment; after all, the political conformation of the present moment 
would be seen as a cons equence of the irreconcilable tension between sovereignty and 
biopolitics as aspects of biopower, as Ojakangas
25 suggests. By the way, the same author 
points  out  that  Agamben  studies  the  “demoniac  combination”  of  modern  state,  which 
exercises “sovereign means to biopolitical endings”
26. Anyway, the opposition between the 
two concepts is less believable, due to the idea that started in Homo Sacer: “the production of 
a biopolitical body is the original contribution of a sovereign power”
27. 
So, I understand that resuming the couple sovereignty versus law in Agamben will not 
bring  good  results,  because  (and  even  here,  supposing)  the  progressiveness  between  the 
authors, Foucault had abandoned this problem in “Security, Territory, Population”. It’s better 
to take Agamben’s attachment to the notion of sovereignty as data of his legal theory-based 
education in Schmittian models, as an emphasis to this aspect or some critics to an eventual 
legalism
28.  
To conclude this topic, we should ask ourselves about the role of law  in both authors, 
outside  of  the  presumably  outdated  problem  of  the  dispute  between  sovereignty  and 
biopolitics.  
 
3. Is Law a hybrid element between sovereignty and biopolitics? 
Since  the  beginning  of  this  paper,  when  I  talk  about  the  conceptual  dispute  between 
sovereignty and biopolitics inside the political frame drawn by not only Foucault but also 
Agamben, I kept the question that, besides cheering up this specific reflection, serves as a 
reason to the research I try to embrace about the two authors: where does the concept of law, 
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as well as the legal techniques, would fit inside their works and in relation to the two already 
mentioned concepts? 
The question is not sterile and also not without a reason. As both authors have dialogues 
with problems related to philosophy of law (state, sovereignty, power), but don’t dare to 
follow  the  tradition  of  the  legal  literature  with  so  much  loyalty,  that  there  is  the  risk  of 
forgetting as well as having a bad comprehension of it.  
In relation to Foucault, I believe that in any other moment a promotion of his image of 
law  and  the  sovereignty  dispositive  has  been  left  aside,  being  both  images  almost 
symmetrical. 
To  reach  this  conclusion,  it’s  enough  to  notice  that  in  the  course  Society  Must  Be 
Defended, from 1976, the law is rejected as a part of sovereignty, or as an almost outdated 
knowledge, while since before Madness and Civilization or Discipline and Punish the legal 
knowledge could be seen as a vector of the procedures of disciplinary normalization
29. 
When he adopts the idea of governamentality, going from the superposition among the 
dispositives (sovereignty, discipline and security) in the formation of the current arrangements 
of power/knowledge, the author equally rejects the law as an own propert y. It would be one, 
from various other possible techniques to implement from one government to the others in the 
biopolitical paradigma. On the other hand, the modernity of law, even when technical, it’s 
only recognized when it admits the maintenance in force of the sovereign power, from which 
we can conclude that law didn’t let go away from sovereignty in the original Foucaldian way 
of thinking. 
Agamben,  talking  about  this  aspect,  partially  escapes  from  the  association  of  law  to 
sovereignty. Like Catherine Mills affirms, “while Foucault's genealogy rejects the search for 
origins and instead traces the emergence of particular configurations of relations of force, 
Agamben seeks to illuminate the 'originary' relationship of law and life”
30. It’s not for other 
reason that the author, in Homo Sacer, resumes the question of the legal nihilism that would 
have been born with the Kantian thought, provoking the “force without significance”
31. On 
the other hand, there is no question about if he would be compared to modern biopolitics, 
because this problem had been overcome by the author when he denies this binomial that 
seemed so important to Foucault in the beginning of his researches. 
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Better than defining the space of the law near sovereignty or biopolitics inside each one 
of the authors, it’s more convenient to admit that this concept, and all the legal theory that is 
adjacent to it, makes up a sensitive point, that reveals the attachment or not of each of them to 
our so well-liked object of study. This is what I intend to develop in the next section. 
 
III. Law as a sensible point: beyond the negation or the emphasis 
1. How to approach the differences between Foucault and Agamben about law? 
As I've pointed out in the last section, there is an evident penetration between Foucault and 
Agamben's works, not only in its methodological aspects but also in the themes from which 
the conceptions of both authors are revealed. It seems to be undoubtful that a formation of a 
contemporary  concept  of  biopolitics,  even  if  we  recognize  the  relevance  of  further 
contributions  of  literature,  it  still  depends  on  a  very  substantial  way  of  the  Foucaldian 
reference, and it is in this point that Agamben, because of his great tribute to Foucault, can go 
ahead in the composition of his own points of view and concepts, as in the paradigmatic case 
of the homo sacer.  
However, when we observe just the treatment given to law in their texts, we can surely 
have an initial impression of disagreement, based in the opposition between a Foucaldian 
image of an almost inexistent law as a proper object of studies and simple projection of the 
dispositive of sovereignty, in comparison to an Agambenian notion of law as a theoretical 
space for the construction of some reference points to biopolitics, as would be the case of Carl 
Schmitt. So, it would be at least one point of radical divergence between them. 
I prefer to overlap this conclusion, because I consider it, in a certain way, unnecessary for 
our aim, which seems more relevant, of introducing the problem of biopolitics inside legal 
theory and its discussions. An emphasis in some eventual disagreement between Foucault and 
Agamben can be, on one hand, positive to the debate if it is taken in a superficial way, but, on 
the other, can also prison the legal problem to an aspect of sympathy versus antipathy and 
cause its carelessness. 
Because of this, I suggest, as a hypothesis, that the differences between the two authors 
must not necessarily be seen as a conflict of negation and recognition of law. So that there is a 
fruitful comparison, stimulating the problem and not only restricting it to be such a “stylistic 
question”  when  dealing  with  the  already  mentioned  and  outdated  dilemma  of  biopolitics 
against sovereignty, I propose the replacement of this debate about the level of importance of 
law as an object by another; it would be the level of bondness of the images of Foucault and 
Agamben  about  law  with  the  legal  thinking.  From  that  point,  I  ask:  Is  Agamben  just  a  
10 
follower  of  “juridical”  themes  of  Foucault  or  a  turning  point,  like  a  developer  of  an 
autonomous line of insertion of legal theory inside biopolitics?  
To illustrate these two possibilities of comprehension, I've selected two specific points of 
both authors for a comparative reading. In the first, I see Foucault far off, and Agamben very 
near the tradition of philosophy of law. In the second, both of them seem to reject the legal 
model.  
 
2. Possible examples of distances and proximities between Foucault and Agamben in the 
understanding of their images about law  
a) From negation of legal theory to its dependence 
As a first example, I return to the point I've mentioned about the dilemma sovereignty versus 
discipline and biopolitics on the two authors.  
In  a  moment  of  his  production,  when  he  starts  his  more  specific  approach  about 
disciplinary  mechanisms  according  to  his  genealogical  perspective,  Foucault  rejects  the 
problem of sovereignty as a fake contemporary impression about Modernity. In a very general 
view,    sovereignty  grows  from  power/knowledge  arrangements  that  are  no  more  real  or 
effective, just working as masks to the exercise of disciplinary power – that one a real and 
original descendent of modern times. 
In the course Society must be defended, that was better commented in the first section of 
this paper, the anachronism of the sovereignty model is stressed in various moments, where 
Foucault reinforces the urgency to abandon it or at least put it out of the central position. Just 
to remember, here follows a part of the third lesson of the course, given in March 21
th 1976: 
(…) the theory of sovereignty is the cycle from subject to subject, from power and the 
powers, the cycle from legitimacy and the law. We can say that, by one way or another, and 
according to its own theoretical schemes in which it is founded, the theory of sovereignty 
presupposes the subject. It wants to found the essential unity of power and always holds in the 
previous element of law. (…) 
The general project, from the previous years and this one, is to try to separate this power 
analysis from the tripod of the subject, the unity and the law, to make it appear, more than the 
founding element of sovereignty, what I would call the domination relations or operators.
32 
 
                                                           
32 Michel Foucault “Il faut défendre la societé”. Paris: Seuil Gallimard, 1997, 38.  
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This theme is better explained in the chapter “Right of Death and Power over Life” from 
the book The Will to Know. After associating the right of life and death over the vassals as 
“one of the typical privileges of the sovereign power”, Foucault mentions that “to the old right 
of make die and let live overcome the new one, of let live and reject the death", typical of 
discipline and the biopower investments, well-known for its “administration of bodies and the 
calculated management of life”
33. 
So,  to  Foucault  the  birth  of  biopower  as  a  comprehensive  sphere  of  new 
power/knowledge arrangements is independent from all theoretical considerations about Law, 
even if this one is taken as an object of studies of philosophy and not of legal theorists. 
Nevertheless, for Agamben, the perspective is quite different: Law is the field of elaboration 
of ideas, and no more an outcast problem. 
We can take the first part of Homo Sacer as an obvious and easy example. In its first 
section, under the title “The paradox of sovereignty", Agamben presents the dilemmas of the 
sovereign as a Janus-faced figure, that is inside and outside legal order at the same time, and 
takes its exceptionality or “exceptional relationship” as an “extreme way of relationship that 
includes something just by excluding it”
34  The same point has originated some years later the 
book State of Exception, in which the same author draws a historical line of the concept of 
state of exception in modern political theory, recasts the Schmittian problem of sovereign 
decision and finally dedicates this field – the field of sovereignty – as the one in which the 
possibility of legal order suspension takes place without its abrogation and, as a consequence, 
anomy
35. 
Back to the first part of  Homo  Sacer,  Agamben  tries  to  face  the  already  mentioned 
paradox  of  sovereignty  in  the  third  section,  so  called  “Potentiality  and  Law”,  with  an 
immediate use of the concepts of constituant and constitued power. He holds up that “the 
basic problem is not that of – not easy but theoretically solvable – conceiving a constituant 
power  that  never  turns  the  course  to  a  constitued  power,  but  rather  that  harder  one  of 
distinguishing clearly the latter from the sovereign power”
36. 
What is interesting in the comparison of these two authors? While Foucault sees the 
problem of Law from an external legal theory point of view that considers it just a secondary 
but  inseparable  aspect  of  the  sovereign  dispositive,  potentially  dominated  by  biopower 
mechanisms, Agamben begins with legal theory, and uses it as a start point or a jumping 
                                                           
33 Michel Foucault, La volonté de savoir. Paris: Gallimard, 1976, 178-184. 
34 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: o poder soberano e a vida nua. Belo Horizonte: UFMG, 2004, 26. 
35 Giorgio Agamben, Estado de exceção. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2004, 39. 
36 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: o poder soberano e a vida nua. Belo Horizonte: UFMG, 2004, 49.  
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board  to  discuss,  as  in  “Potentiality  and  Law”,  themes  such  as  virtualities  or  creative 
potentialities.  
Therefore, it is announced, at least in this point, a remarkable origin difference between 
Foucauldian and Agambenian thoughts, and it makes harder any possibilities of comparison. 
We cannot admit with such stillness a continuum if Agamben takes some basis and theoretical 
references  that  Foucault  has  never  imagined  to  use.  More  than  that,  Agamben  actually 
depends of legal theory to explain the problem of homo sacer and sovereignty, and in any 
moment  it  is  apart  from  it.  To  sum  up,  there  would  not  be  Agamben  without  a  strong 
Schmittianism  as  a  background;  this  dependence,  in  my  opinion,  is  enough  to  suggest  a 
difference between the two authors beyond the problem of negation or emphasis about the 
concept of law in a biopolitical approach. 
 
b) From the paradox of the expected resistance to the profanation of the dispositives  
Talking  on  Foucault  and  before  any  consideration  about  problems  like  sovereignty  or 
biopolitics, we must take his concept of power as a relational, non economical dimension of 
forces exercised in very plural ways as part of many dispositives. The author defines it as 
immanent to relationships because of its separation from any metaphysical or super structural 
reason;  intentional  to  reveal  itself  in  operations,  but  anonymous  because  it  independs  of 
individual  subjects  decisions,  of    governors,  state  nor  rationality;  and,  as  an  end, 
inapprehensible for its absence of any stable point. So, power is a relationship rather than an 
object
37. On the other hand, Foucault rejects the ide a of any totality of power that is not 
“everywhere” as we may say based in initial readings. In his words, “power does not cover 
everything, it comes from everything”
38. 
However, our announced theoretical problem is bigger than the concept of power, cause 
it’s concerned with finding ways by which inside this Foucaldian power landscape it would be 
possible  the  exercise  of  equally  relational  way  of  resistance,  of  opposition  to 
power/knowledge dominant strategies in a certain moment of time. After all, to Foucault there 
is power where there is resistance, but this is never in an external position in relation to the 
first one. So we can say that resistance could not be seen apart from power, because it comes 
in the exact moment when a point of the diagram of relations gets updated or make active a 
web of codified subjectivities in a same level of knowledge, and permits by this way the 
exercise of power.  
                                                           
37 Michel Foucault, La volonté de savoir. Paris: Gallimard, 1976, 123-125. 
38 Michel Foucault, La volonté de savoir. Paris: Gallimard, 1976, p. 122.  
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In a very short explanation, I take the image of an almost instantaneous resistance to 
power.  When  a  new  power  relation  gets  actual  inside  the  arrangements  of  any  of  the 
dispositives,  it  has  already  predicted  and  carried  within  a  new  way  of  resistance,  that  is 
programmed and very well absorbed by the same arrangement from which it intended to rise 
against. It would be to me a paradox of the expected resistance that would eliminate or even 
quench the uprise of dispositive's alternatives. 
The problem was understood by Jürgen Habermas and Gilles Deleuze in texts from the 
80's. The first, in a more critical and less optimistic approach about the Foucaldian thought, 
sees in this paradox an aporia, because the subjects would necessarily resist against the power 
investments but if all resistances are part of a predetermined scheme of forces, there would 
not be more forms for a real and creative resistance
39. 
Deleuze adopts a more optimistic version in comparison to Habermas. He considers the 
Foucaldian thought increases the great temptation of trying to extract hidden resistances from 
the already existent power relations. The lack of alternatives to the diagrams or dispositives 
seen from inside gets Foucault to a search of ideal resistances from the Outside, by the study 
of infamous lives, subjectivization experiences and transgression images that, if were well 
codified, would compose a field of opposition to the present ones
40. However, to recognize 
this appeal to a constituant potentiality dimension out of the dispositives just shows the limits 
of the Foucaldian model of dealing with the rise of non -predictable resistances inside the 
established power networks. 
Hence it follows that is not an idea of resistance to Foucault that remembers the images 
of insurrection or even a juridical-based revolution against an aim. Agamben, in a contrary 
sense, seems to take this second path, that in any moment appeals to a classical legal model of 
resistance by an attack to a legal order. 
In his What is a Dispositive? Agamben keeps devoted to the concept theme of the essay 
and takes it as a necessary contribution of Foucault to the understanding of contemporary 
biopolitics. In his words a dispositive is “anything that has by any means the capacity of 
capturing,  guiding, determining, intercepting, modeling,  controlling  and assuring  gestures, 
conducts,  opinions  and  speeches  of  the  living  beings”
41.  The  author  asseverates  that  a 
                                                           
39 Jürgen Habermas, Aporias de uma teoria do poder, In: O discurso filosófico da modernidade: doze lições. São 
Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2000, 397. 
40 Gilles Deleuze,  Foucault. Paris: Minuit, 1986, 126-130. 
41 Giorgio Agamben, O que é um dispositivo?, In: O que é o contemporâneo? e outros ensaios. Chapecó: Argos, 
2009, 40.  
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subjectivity appears in the middle point of appropriation between these free lives and the 
dispositives, by multiple and growing processes of subjectivization
42. 
Nothing to say about this continuity, that seems very reasonable to me. The problem that 
I see is situated in a later moment of the recognition of dispositives, which is the moment of 
resistance against them. Agamben does not offer to us, or have not offered until this moment, 
a  legal  answer  inserted  at  the  legal  theo ry  tradition  that  could  face  the  magnetical 
characteristic of Foucaldian dispositives that gradually absorbs all the possible data and 
practices. There is not an opposite to dispositives, a new possible order that could replace 
them. So, the power relationships attached to the historical arrangements that are condensed 
in a given dispositive will be no more an object for an organized resistance from the subjects. 
After all, they are just parts of it, parts of the dispositives. 
When Agamben had discussed the pornography as an art dispositive in Profanations, he 
says:  
 
Every dispositive of power has always been doubled: on one hand, it becomes from an individual 
behaviour of subjectivation, and on the other from its capture within a separated sphere. By itself the 
individual behaviour doesn't mean anything disapprovable and eventually, when not conditioned by 
circumstances, just the fact of being kept in a dispositive.
43 
 
The Agambenian resistance would happen in this point of view by the exercise of profanation. 
Without any more detailed explanations about the religious origins of this concept, it means 
“the counterdispositive that brings back to common use something already split and divided 
by the sacrifice”
44. I believe that when Agamben adopts this capture model to dispositives and 
the idea of individual struggles for resistance as profanations, he suggests that even Law, as 
one of the various techniques of biopower, could be part of a profanation strategy. However, 
in the point I am interested about at this moment, this answer just sustains the same standards 
from the previous answers given by Foucault in the 70's as formless insurrections, too far 
from the notion of political resistance or “right to resist” that is dominant in modern legal 
theory. So in this second example of the topic, there is no legal influence to be observed in 
Agamben, but a strong and evident subordination to the same standard proposed by Foucault 
                                                           
42 Giorgio Agamben, O que é um dispositivo?, In: O que é o contemporâneo? e outros ensaios. Chapecó: Argos, 
2009, 41-42. 
43 Giorgio Agamben, Profanações. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2007, 79. 
44 Giorgio Agamben, O que é um dispositivo?, In: O que é o contemporâneo? e outros ensaios. Chapecó: Argos, 
2009, 45.  
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of the expected resistances and the need of an opposition to dispositives by the escape from its 
capitation potentialities and some kind of sabotage of its mechanisms.  
 
IV. Conclusion: Agamben as a Foucaldian legal theorist? 
This paper does not run out the theme and did not want to achieve this goal. Nevertheless I 
strongly believe that even a very simple positioning of some close and conflict points allow us 
to reposition the relation of the works of Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben about Law. 
That is not an easy theme if we consider that neither of them has dedicated their efforts to this 
object. Beyond this, however, some methodological conclusions to future researches can be 
presented. 
The first of them concerns the disentailness of a serious study of Law in their works from 
the old debate about sovereignty versus biopolitics. I risk saying that today it is meaningless 
to reinforce this opposition. Law is clearly taken and recognized by them as one technique of 
domination  among  others,  and  that  has  been  captured  with  a  notorious  efficiency  by  the 
predominant  dispositives  of  each  historical  period  –  and  especially  by  the  contemporary 
biopolitics. 
On the other hand, I cannot take Agamben as a “Foucaldian jurist”. His approach to Law 
gives to it the status of a specific theme and his various analysis have never stressed to us 
readers and scholars the Foucaldian opinion about this object, but rather his own theoretical 
referential that remembers Carl Schmitt and in some wide-range discussion about justice the 
enigmatic essays of Walter Benjamin. To sum up, Agamben can even be criticized to his 
strong and excessive ties and links to the legal theory tradition, but we don’t seem to find in 
his works a “Foucaldian Law” version. 
When  examining  compared  examples  from  the  works  of  these  two  authors,  we  can 
identify some variations between an attachment or not to legal theory concepts and problems. 
If Foucault decides to solemnly ignore this field of knowledge, Agamben sometimes comes 
near and, some other times, stands behind or dismisses it. 
It is out of question that these random comparisons are by themselves susceptible of 
critics. However, with this paper I have tried to throw away the fake idea of a continuous line 
from Foucault to Agamben about Law inside biopolitics. In the future I hope it’s easier to 
admit, in a more refined version, a concept of biopolitics inside legal theory. 
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